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Abstract
Challenge Theory (CT), a new approach to decision under risk departs significantly 
from expected utility, and is based on firmly psychological, rather than economic, 
assumptions. The paper demonstrates that a purely cognitive-psychological paradigm 
for decision under risk can yield excellent predictions, comparable to those attained 
by more complex economic or psychological models that remain attached to 
conventional economic constructs and assumptions. The study presents a new model 
for predicting the popularity of choices made in binary risk problems.
A CT-based regression model is tested on data gathered from 126 respondents who 
indicated their preferences with respect to 44 choice problems. Results support CT's
central hypothesis, strongly associating between the Challenge Index (CI) attributable 
to every binary risk problem, and the observed popularity of the bold prospect in that 
problem (with r=-0.92 and r=-0.93 for gains and for losses, respectively). The novelty 
of the CT perspective as a new paradigm is illuminated by its simple, single-index
(CI) representation of psychological effects proposed by Prospect Theory for 
describing choice behavior (certainty effect, reflection effect, overweighting small 
probabilities and loss aversion). 
Keywords: Decision Making under Risk; Dual System Model; Cognitive Processes; 
Gambling; Risky Choice by Gender, Risky Choice by Wealth
1. Introduction
In the Expected Utility Theory (EUT) the utility of an uncertain prospect is the sum of 
the utilities of the outcomes, each weighted by its probability. In choosing between 
two or more prospects, the rational decision-maker should prefer a prospect that 
maximizes utility (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947; Savage, 1954). Given a 
decision problem whose prospects have different utilities, a unique prospect should be 
chosen by different people as well as by the same person on different occasions.
Systematic violations of the EUT observed in human behavior have led to the
development of descriptive theories, that aim to predict people's actual decision 
behavior. Such descriptive theories tend to adopt EUT's conceptual framework as a 
point of departure and proceed to explain observed violations of EUT by introducing 
modifications to this basic theory. Thus, Prospect Theory (PT) (Kahneman & 
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2Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), arguably the most influential
descriptive model, accounts for observed violations of EUT axioms by proposing 
functions that assign effective values to gains and to losses (rather than to the total 
assets); and effective weights to the given probabilities. A different modification of 
EUT is proposed, e.g., by Regret Theory (Loomes & Sugden, 1982, 1987): a
prospect's utility-function is fashioned to incorporate feelings of regret and rejoicing 
anticipated by the decision maker. The decision maker aims then to maximize the 
expected modified utility function.   
PT and similar descriptive models, referred to as deterministic, follow in EUT's
footsteps in their aim to predict the one prospect that is preferable to all others, where 
the empirical confirmation of the prediction is embodied in the modal prospect, the 
one preferred by most respondents in a sample of decision makers. Striving for a 
unique solution may be natural for an economic-prescriptive theory concerned with 
profit optimization but is less natural for a genuine descriptive theory, concerned with 
predicting people's actual behavior. From such a theory one would expect a richer 
characterization of choice behavior, such as people's inclination to prefer each of the 
prospects offered, as reflected in the distribution of responses to a given risk problem. 
Indeed, stochastic decision theories have been proposed (for example, Busemeyer & 
Townsand, 1993; Erev et al., 2002) that aim to predict the popularity of a particular 
prospect, notably in binary risk problems.
A distinct birthmark inherited from EUT by many descriptive theories is the
assignment of a value V(f) to every prospect f, such that prospect f is preferred to
prospect g iff V(f)>V(g). And, in line with EUT, V(f) is computed as the sum of the 
outcome utilities, each weighted by a transformation of corresponding probability
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) or by decision weights that derive from transforming 
the entire cumulative distribution function (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). Thus,
predictions of descriptive theories assume (tacitly at least) that a decision maker faced 
with two or more risky prospects performs in effect the following mental operations:
(a) Multiplying the outcome-value by the outcome probability-weight to obtain the 
expected utility for each outcome; 
(b) Summing up the expected utilities of all outcomes of a prospect, to obtain the 
prospect's value V(f); 
(c) Comparing the overall utilities of all prospects offered, identifying one of highest 
value. 
The essential structure of the prospect-utility assessments (steps (a) and (b)) is clearly 
illustrated by the weighted-sum form of the value V(f) assigned to each prospect f:
ܸ(݂) = ෍[ݒ(ݔ௜) ∙ ݓ(݌௜)]
(See, for example, Tversky & Kahneman, 1992, Eq. (2); Loomes & Sugden 1982, Eq. 
(2); Erev et al., 2010, Eq. (1)).
Having determined the value V(f) for each of the available prospects, step (c), of 
comparing every pair of prospects, amounts to computing the difference between their
values (for example, Loomes & Sugden, 1982, eq. (4)) or a monotone function of that 
difference (Erev et al., 2010, eq. (4)). This is true for stochastic theories as well for 
3deterministic theories. (See, for example, Busemeyer & Townsand, 1993; Erev et al.,
2002).
While the three operations (a)-(c) may well be performed by adequately schooled 
people acting within a professional setting, they are not likely to be mentally carried 
out by people (schooled or not) in daily intuitive decision making. Evidently,
descriptive theories have not substantiated or rationalized these mental operations to 
be part of any psychological modeling of decision making under risk. Rather, most 
descriptive theories began by accepting EUT and proceeded to modify it just as
necessary in order to account for observed violations of its axioms and prescriptions. 
Adherence to EUT conceptual framework, including the weighted-sum criterion
traditionally constrained the development of a genuine descriptive theory for choice 
under risk. Hence psychological theories that focus on the decision process rather than 
on its consequences, have emerged. See Weber & Johnson (2009) for a review of 
choice phenomena research that hinges on psychological -- cognitive and affective --
processes. Among these, processes that rely on the dual system approach (Stanovich 
& West, 2000; Kahneman, 2011) have a special appeal in as much as they attempt to 
integrate two distinct kinds of processes that directly concern stimuli evaluation and 
decision-making: the automatic system and the analytic system. Indeed, dual 
processing models for decision making have been employed for explaining decision 
behavior (e.g., Kahneman, 2003; Sanfey et al., 2006). 
The automatic system (also referred to as System 1 or Type 1 processing) is 
autonomic: The execution of System 1 processing is involuntary and typically rapid
and unconscious (Stanovich, 2011). System 1 processing has been described as
associative and heuristic (e.g., Sloman, 1996; Evans, 1984; 1989); as relying on 
intuitive cognition (Hammond, 1996); as tacit thought processes (Evans & Over, 
1996) including tacit inferences (Johnson-Laird, 1983); as an automatic activation 
(Posner & Snyder, 1975); and as evolutionary old (Evans, 2008). In contrast with the 
automatic system, processing of the analytic system (also referred to as System 2 or 
Type 2 processing) is deliberate and slow, involving controlled analytic intelligence. 
It has also been described as a rule-based system (e.g., Sloman, 1996); as relying on
analytical cognition (Hammond, 1996); as an explicit thought process (Evans & Over, 
1996) including explicit inferences (Johnson-Laird, 1983); as a conscious processing 
system (Posner & Snyder, 1975) and as evolutionary new (Evans, 2008). 
The automatic system, like the analytic system, is characterized by an emphasis on the 
cognitive behavior mode (cf. Evans, 2008. Note also its description in terms of 
intuitive cognition; thought processes; and inferences). Yet, free from a higher control 
system, it also incorporates beliefs and affective behaviors, shaped by psychological
and social evolutionary processes, as fast, effort-saving ways for heuristically coping 
with adaptive problems (Finucane et al., 2000; Loewenstein et al., 2001). However, 
under the umbrella of the dual system approach to decision-making, the two systems 
are often interpreted as representing the very distinction between the affective and the 
cognitive modes of decision-making behavior (see e.g., Rottenstreich & Hsee, 2001; 
Hsee & Rottenstreich, 2004). An application of the affective-cognitive duality to 
decision making is proposed by Mukherjee's (2010) model depicting the decision 
process as a convex combination of affective and cognitive processes, each marked by 
characteristic shapes of the value function and of the weighting function.
4In this article, we develop a new theory, called the Challenge Theory (CT), that 
examines decisions under risk as a behavioral phenomenon in and by itself, free of 
any preconception of which decisions are rational or otherwise desirable; a domain of 
investigation in which stable empirical patterns, and ultimately laws, are to be 
discovered, leading to predictions in this domain. In so doing we believe we follow 
the common practice in theory-oriented empirical sciences. 
Challenge Theory is a dual system theory in that it acknowledges that two kinds of 
processes, two systems, participate in decision making: the fast (automatic) and the 
slow (analytic). While formulating the two systems in essentially cognitive terms (à la
Stanovich, e.g.), CT does not preclude the possibility that decision maker's feelings, 
actual or anticipated, play some role in both systems: in the automatic system, as a
fast way to respond; and in the analytic system as an object (among others) to be 
considered in the deliberate calculations. Furthermore, CT models the systems as 
working sequentially, with the automatic processing reaching a fast, initial decision,
followed by the analytic processing, acting in a supervisory role: affirming or 
modifying the initial decision. This is in contrast with Mukherjee's (2010) dual system 
model, where two processing systems, the one defined as affective and the other as 
cognitive, are described as operating in parallel.
The plan of this article is as follows. Section 2 presents a reconstruction of the 
decision maker's cognitive process in the face of a binary choice problem, culminating
in a formula that assesses the degree of difficulty, or challenge-level, experienced by 
the decision maker in abandoning the option defined here as the default option and 
choosing the option defined here as the bold option. Section 3 presents and tests the 
General Hypothesis of Challenge Theory, namely, that the challenge level, 
attributable to every binary choice problem, predicts people's inclination (probability) 
to choose the bold option in that problem. The possibility afforded by the Challenge 
Theory to explore individual differences is illustrated in Section 4. The discussion in 
Section 5 elaborates on the specifications, significance and implications of Challenge 
Theory as a novel paradigm. It also elaborates on CT's integrated representation of 
psychological effects proposed by Prospect Theory, as well as on some general 
questions – the role of extant wealth in gambling and the gain-loss asymmetry.
2. Decision-making as a mental process: a reconstruction
We are concerned with choice problems where the decision-maker must choose one 
of k+1 prospects, (x0, p0), (x1, p1) … (xk, pk), wherein the outcome of each is a 
monetary gain, xi (0<xi<∞) with a known probability pi (0<pi≤1), i=0,1,…,k and 0 
with probability (1- pi). We assume p0>p1>p2>…>pk and 0<x0< x1<…<xk. 
Alternatively, the outcome of each of the k+1 prospects is a monetary loss, xi             
(-∞<xi<0) with a known probability pi (0<pi≤1), i=0, 1,…,k and 0 with probability
(1-pi). Here, xi being all negative, we assume p0>p1>p2>…>pk and 0>x0>x1>…>xk.
A choice problem with these characteristics will be called a simple decision problem. 
In this article we consider simple binary decision problems, those with k=1. This
class of problems has been used extensively in previous studies and simulates many
common problems encountered in real-life situations. The ideas developed here can 
be extended to decision problems with any k. Our aim is to develop a theory, as 
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people's inclination (probability) to prefer one of the prospects in a binary decision 
problem over the other. 
2.1 The case of gains
Let us consider first gain problems, i.e., decision problems with x1>x0>0. The 
decision-maker is faced with two options (x0, p0) and (x1, p1), each containing two 
numerical parameters, the (positive) outcome, xi, and the probability of receiving it, 
pi. The total information input consists therefore of four numerical values to be 
processed mentally in order to reach a decision. The decision-maker's initial 
impression of the problem is governed by his automatic mental processing system 
(System 1 or Type 1 processing, (Stanovich & West, 2000; Stanovich 2011; cf. also
Kahneman, 2011), which, we claim, stresses the probabilities rather than the 
outcomes. Hence, we assume that a person's initial attraction, or default preference, 
would be to (x0, p0), the prospect that promises the highest probability for some gain. 
This assumption is based on an extension of the certainty effect (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979) which posits the preference of the sure outcome over the unsure 
outcome, to the more general assertion that posits the preference of the surer (more 
probable) outcome over the less sure outcome. But there is a more substantive
rationale for (x0, p0) being the heuristic choice of the automatic processing system: 
this system, by its very nature, concerns the most vital organismic needs, including 
the survival of the organism. If gaining some amount, however small, of a vital 
resource can save the organism, then just maximizing the probability of its attainment 
would be the right response.
If the decision is not of urgent nature, the initial automatic preference is tentatively 
withheld, and is followed by an analytic processing (System 2 or Type 2 processing, 
(Stanovich & West, 2000; Stanovich 2011; cf. also Kahneman, 2011). The analytic 
processing system consists in comparing, weighting, and generally re-assessing the 
initial response of the automatic processing system. In fact, "One of the most critical 
functions of Type 2 processing is to override Type 1 processing" (Stanovich, 2011, p. 
20). Indeed, the opportunity to win a greater amount, x1, albeit with reduced 
probability, prompts the decision-maker to re-consider his initial automatic preference 
of prospect (x0, p0), and analyze all available information, x0, p0, x1, p1. For this 
purpose, the decision-maker creates images of the possible consequences of each of 
the choices1. 
Our attempt to capture the analytic System 2 processing hinges on the assumption that 
prospect (x1, p1) in effect challenges the chooser to abandon the default prospect (x0,
p0) and choose it, (x1, p1), the bold prospect2. The challenge consists in facing the 
dissonance anticipated should the bold prospect be chosen, and the chooser loses the 
gamble. Psychologically, the dissonance anticipated may be of any of four kinds, or 
modalities: conative (regret, where the gambler would conclude he should have acted
differently); cognitive (where the gambler realizes that the outcome conflicts with his 
prior perceptions, judgments or calculations); affective (feeling of disappointment and 
1 Cf. "[better responses] come from processes of hypothetical reasoning and cognitive simulation that 
are a unique aspect of Type 2 processing." Stanovich, (2011, p. 22).
2 The term bold play has been used in a somewhat similar sense in the study of subfair red and black 
casino with zero-one utility function (Dubins & Savage, 1965; Shye, 1968; Heath et al., 1972).
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realization that one's choice-behavior conflicts with one's self-image, values, or 
adopted norms)3. An assessment of the total challenge presented by the various forms 
of dissonance is of interest in that, as we shall see, it can help predict people's 
inclination to choose the bolder prospects when faced with decision under risk; and 
possibly suggest which human traits correspond to higher inclination to prefer bold 
prospects. We turn therefore to an assessment of the magnitude of the described 
challenge. The following assessment is based on a reconstruction of possible mental 
processes that take place in the chooser's mind.
Faced with a binary gains problem, the chooser imagines the situation in which he 
would be, if he gambles on the bold prospect, (x1, p1), and loses. His attention would 
then turn to the lower amount, x0, which he could have had with a higher probability: 
ceteris paribus, the greater it is, the greater the anticipated dissonance; and therefore,
the greater the challenge posed by the bold prospect. Hence, we conclude that this 
challenge increases with x0.
The role of the greater amount, x1, in this decision-making situation seems clear. It is 
this amount that lures the chooser and beckons her to pick the bold prospect. The 
chooser may contemplate: "should I lose my gamble on the bold prospect, I could 
rationalize that the prospect of winning this greater amount, x1, justified my choice: I 
gave myself a chance".  The greater is this amount, the lower the anticipated 
dissonance; and the lower the challenge presented by the bold prospect. We conclude
therefore that this challenge decreases with x1. 
Finally, how do the given probabilities figure in the assessment of the challenge 
calculation? Having lost the bold gamble, the chooser would not like to feel he had 
made a grave error in judgment (cognitive dissonance). Thus, if p0 is very close to p1
the anticipated dissonance would be correspondingly small, since he could rationalize: 
"under these circumstances I could have just as well (with a similar probability) lost 
the smaller amount". But if p0 is much higher than p1, dissonances of all kinds could 
creep in. In general, then, the greater the difference p0-p1, the greater the anticipated 
dissonance; and the greater the challenge posed by the bold prospect. We conclude
therefore that in general this challenge increases with p0-p1. 
The Challenge Index (CI) in the case of gains, posed to the chooser by the bold 
prospect (x1, p1) relative to the default prospect (x0, p0), could therefore be given by:
(1)                                  	ܥܫ[(ݔ଴,݌଴), (ݔଵ,݌ଵ)] = ௙బ(௫బ)௙భ(௫భ) ݃(݌଴ − ݌ଵ)
where each of f0, f1 and g is a non-decreasing function of its respective argument.
Eq. (1) assumes that the subtraction of p1 from p0 is mentally performed on these
same figures as presented to the decision-maker; and that the decision-maker 
subsequently transforms the difference p0-p1 by ݃.  An alternative, perhaps more 
likely assumption would be that each of the probabilities pi is first transformed, or 
3 The first three behavior modalities are well known in psychological literature. The fourth, the 
valuative, concerns adopted beliefs and values that guide the individual (without the individual's 
actively evaluating them, hence it differs from the cognitive modality). The valuative modality can be 
shown by the Faceted Action System Theory (Shye, 1985; 2014) to complete a 2X2 cartesian product 
set, of which the first three modalities are a subset.  
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probabilities is performed. This assumption results in a variant expression for CI:
(2)																								ܥܫ[(ݔ଴,݌଴), (ݔଵ,݌ଵ)] = ௙బ(௫బ)௙భ(௫భ) (ݓ଴(݌଴) − ݓଵ	(݌ଵ	))
where f0, f1, w0, w1 are non-decreasing functions of their respective arguments, and w0,
w1 are such that ݓ଴(݌଴)− ݓଵ	(݌ଵ	) > 0.
2.2 The case of losses
Let us look now at decision problems with x1<x0<0. The decision-maker is faced with 
two options (x0, p0) and (x1, p1), with p1<p0, each containing two numerical 
parameters, the (negative) outcomes, xi, and the probabilities of receiving them, pi.
Again, the total information input consists of four numerical values to be processed 
mentally in order to reach a decision. But the decision-maker's initial impression of 
the problem is governed by his automatic mental processing system (System 1 
processing), which, in this case too, is assumed to stress the probabilities rather than 
the outcomes. Hence, now, in the case of losses, we assume that a person's initial 
attraction, or default preference, would be (x1, p1); that is, the prospect that promises 
the lowest probability for any loss. This assumption, too, may be regarded an 
extension of the certainty effect, where the preference of a sure avoidance of a loss is 
extended to the preference for a surer avoidance (smaller probability) of a loss. This 
assumption is supported by deeper considerations: Geared to avoid any negative 
consequence, the rapid System 1 processing tends to focus on the probabilities rather 
than on assessing the relative gravity of the consequences4.
Time and circumstances allowing, the analytic System 2 processing re-examines the 
automatic preference of (x1, p1), in view of the promise for a smaller loss (albeit with 
a higher probability) presented by the (loss-related-) bold prospect (x0, p0), weighing 
now all four pieces of information, x0, p0, x1, p1.  Again, as in the case of gains, the 
decision-maker is challenged to abandon the (loss-related-) default prospect (x1, p1)
and choose the bold prospect, (x0, p0), instead5. The challenge consists in facing the 
dissonance anticipated should the bold prospect be chosen, and the chooser loses the 
gamble. We turn therefore to an assessment of the magnitude of this challenge. The 
4 Cf. in the context of crime prevention, "Research shows clearly that the chance of being caught is a 
vastly more effective deterrent than even draconian punishment" (National Institute of Justice, 2016).
That is, increased risk of being caught (and getting some punishment) affects choice behavior more 
than increased punishments. See also Nagin, 2013.
5 To illustrate the terminology and designations of this article consider the following examples of two 
problems: 
Default Prospect Bold Prospect
Gain problem (200, 0.8)
(x0, p0)
(300, 0.6)
(x1, p1)
Loss problem (-300, 0.6)
(x1, p1)
(-200, 0.8)
(x0, p0)
In both, gain and loss problems, prospect (x0, p0) is characterized by the smaller amount (in absolute 
value) and by the higher probability, compared with the alternative prospect (x1, p1). In gains, prospect 
(x0, p0) is defined as the default; and in losses prospect (x1, p1) is defined as the default. This 
designation allows for a single CI formula (3) for both gains and for losses. Note that in the case of 
losses, the definition of the bold prospect differs from the common definition of the risky prospect.
8following assessment is based on a reconstruction of possible mental processes that
take place in the chooser's mind.
Faced with a binary loss problem, the chooser imagines the situation in which he 
would be if he gambles on the bold prospect, (x0, p0), and loses. His attention would 
then turn to comparing the lower probability, p1, of the default (higher loss) prospect
with the (higher) probability p0, with which he just lost the gamble. If p0 is very close 
to p1 the anticipated dissonance would be correspondingly small, since the decision-
maker could rationalize: "Under these circumstances I could have just as well (with a 
similar probability) lost the higher amount, x1." But if p0 is much higher than p1, the 
dissonance could be great, since had he chosen the default (x1, p1) he could have, with 
greater probability, avoided any loss. In general, then, the greater the difference p0-p1, 
the greater the anticipated dissonance; and the greater the challenge posed by the bold 
prospect. We conclude therefore that in general this challenge increases with p0-p1. 
The appeal, if any, of the bold prospect lies in its lower loss, |x0|, (|x0|<|x1|). Ceteris 
paribus, the greater this lower loss, |x0|, the lower its appeal and the greater the 
anticipated dissonance; and therefore, the greater the challenge posed by the bold 
prospect. Hence, we conclude that this challenge increases with |x0|.
The role of the greater loss, |x1|, in this decision-making situation, seems clear. It is 
this larger loss that may tempt the chooser to consider the bold alternative with its
promise for a lower loss. The higher the default loss, |x1|, the lower the anticipated 
dissonance; and the lower the challenge presented by the bold prospect. We conclude
therefore that this challenge decreases with |x1|. 
Adopting the assumption that it is the difference between weighted probabilities
(rather than the weight of the difference between the probabilities) that should 
incorporated into the expression for the Challenge Index, CI, eq. 2 holds for both loss 
problems as well as for gains problems:
(3)                        ܥܫ[(ݔ଴,݌଴), (ݔଵ,݌ଵ)] = ௙బ|௫బ|௙భ|௫భ| ൫ݓ଴(݌଴)− ݓଵ	(݌ଵ	)൯
Where f0, f1, w0, w1 are non-decreasing functions of their respective arguments, and 
w0, w1 are such that   ݓ଴(݌଴)− ݓଵ	(݌ଵ	) > 0.
3. The Challenge Theory of Choice under Risk
Our main purpose is to explain and facilitate the prediction of people's inclination to 
prefer the bold prospect in a specified binary decision problem, where both prospects
involve monetary gains (or, alternatively, both involve monetary losses) with known 
probabilities. Here, preference inclination is interpreted for a given population as the
proportion of persons in that population who choose the bold prospect in the specified
problem. The notion of Challenge is developed, and the Challenge index (CI) 
formulated, with this purpose in mind. 
3.1 The General Challenge Hypothesis: The greater the challenge, CI, associated with 
a binary simple problem, the less likely are people to choose the bold prospect.
9Rationale: The challenge as defined presents an obstacle for the chooser in deciding
to prefer the bold prospect over the default. The greater the challenge, the fewer the 
people who would surmount this obstacle.
Scales: To test the general hypothesis, further specifications need to be made 
concerning the functional forms of f0, f1, w0, w1. For examining the viability of the 
psychologically based Challenge Theory as a descriptive theory, we adopt here those
widely used forms that seem to us both promising and simple (not involving too many 
free parameters). Thus, for f0 and f1 we adopt the power function:
(4)                                              ଴݂ = 	 ݔ௔బ																 ଵ݂ = 	 ݔ௔భ
and for w0, w1, we adopt the two-parameter "linear in log odds" functional form
advanced by Gonzalez & Wu (1999):
(5)                                                	ݓ௜(݌) = ఋ೔௣ം೔ఋ೔௣ം೔ା	(ଵି௣)ം೔            i = 0, 1
characterized by two parameters: γi, that determines mainly the curvature of the 
weighting function (ranging from near linear to near step-function); and δi, that 
determines mainly the elevation of the weighting function, i.e., the overall inclination 
to underweight or overweight probabilities.
As a measure of association between CI and the proportion of those preferring the 
bold prospect, we use the correlation coefficient, r.
With the present choices of functional forms for the outcomes and the probabilities, 
Challenge Theory allows, in principle, for up to six free parameters for gains: a0, γ0, δ0, 
a1, γ1, δ1 and up to six free parameters for losses: a'0, γ'0, δ'0, a'1, γ'1, δ'1. Naturally, the 
greater the number of free parameters, the better the fit of the model to the data of a 
particular study, but the greater the risk of overfitting. In this study we examined 3, 4 
and 6 parameter models and chose to present and elaborate on the model with the 4 
parameters: a0, a1, γ, δ (i.e., γ0= γ1 ; δ0= δ1) for gains; and with the 4 parameters: a'0, a'1,
γ', δ' for losses. This choice was based primarily on the extent of improvement in r, the 
resultant correlation coefficient between CI, the challenge level, and Pb, the 
proportion of respondents preferring the bold option. (See discussion in Section 5.5 
below.)
3.2 Testing the General Challenge Hypothesis
3.2.1 Data
The data set for this study consists of responses to a questionnaire obtained from a 
sample of 126 twelfth-grade students at two upscale high schools in Jerusalem.
Students in these schools are generally considered to be conscientious and highly 
motivated and they seemed to address themselves to the task of completing the 
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questionnaires with due attention and concentration. No material incentives were 
offered.6
The questionnaire included 44 simple binary choice problems, 22 gain problems and 
22 loss problems. Problems were selected to represent a fairly wide range, with gains 
and losses ranging from 30 to 9000 Israeli Shekels; and probabilities ranging from 
0.01 to 1. 
Analyses were performed also on data collected from samples of students and faculty 
members by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Eleven simple binary choice problems 
were found in these data (six gain problems and five loss problems).
For every choice problem, vi, two variables were recorded:
i. The Challenge Index, CI(vi), as computed by equation (3);
ii. The percentage, Pb(vi), of respondents who choose the bold prospect.
To test the Challenge Hypothesis, Pearson correlation coefficient, r, between CI and 
Pb was determined while searching for optimal values for the parameters x0, x1, γ, δ
defined in Eqs. (4) and (5). The optimization was performed using Microsoft Excel 
GRG solver.
In accordance with the hypothesis, we expected high negative correlations between
CI(vi) and Pb(vi).
3.2.2 Results
Analyses were performed separately for gain problems and for loss problems since 
evidence points to the fact that these two classes of problems are perceived differently 
by decision makers (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992. 
See also discussion below). Hence the values of parameters, a0, a1, γ, δ, may well be 
expected to differ for losses and for gains.
Results obtained support the general challenge hypothesis: the greater the Challenge 
Index, CI, associated with a binary decision problem, the smaller the percentage of 
6 Incentives could interfere with the main purpose of the study, namely, to understand decisions made 
by unschooled people as well as by schooled people in their everyday life, decisions that (according to 
CT) result from of the mental interaction between the (automatic) system 1 and the (deliberate, 
calculating) system 2. Incentives are known to encourage the deliberate, calculating system 2. (Often 
this is indeed why they are used.) Since most of our respondents are familiar with the notion of 
expected value, they would regard the questions as a test of their knowledge (and hence aim for the 
economically "correct" answer), rather than reveal their endogenous inclination. Thus, the spontaneous 
balance between the two processing systems could be impaired. In the context of descriptive theories in 
general (not just dual system theories), some writers believe that incentives are not essential. For 
example, Camerer (1989) finds that "Subjects who actually played a gamble were no more reliable than 
subjects who did not play" and concludes his test of the effect of incentives: "Incentives make little 
difference in subjects' choices among gambles involving gains" (pp. 82-83). Tversky & Kahneman 
(1992) conclude their discussion on the question of incentives thus: "The similarity between the results 
obtained with and without monetary incentives in choice between simple prospects provides no special 
reason for skepticism about experiments without contingent payment" (p. 316).
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respondents who chose the bold prospect. This is found for the set of gain problems (r
= -.92) as well as for the set of loss problems (r = -.93). See Table 1.
Table 1. Pearson Correlation Coefficients, r, between Challenge Index, CI, and 
Observed Proportion, Pb, of Bold Responses
for Gains and for Loss problems
r
0.95 
confidence 
interval
a0 a1 γ δ
Gains Problems
n=22; N=126 -.919
(-.966, -.813) 1.1936 1.2285 0.7336 2.6245
Loss Problems
n=22; N=126 -.931
(-.971, -.839) 1.3349 1.4337 0.6505 3.5565
Interestingly a0, a1 >1 both for losses and for gains, suggesting that, under the 
conceptual framework developed here, a convex value function optimizes predictions
of bold choices. Indeed, the possibility of convex value (utility) functions, or 
functions are convex in segments of the monetary domain have been proposed and 
studied in the literature (e.g., Dubins & Savage, 1965; Friedman & Savage, 1948; 
Markowitz, 1952;). However, CT proposes a reformulation of the question of
outcome values. See Subsection 5.4 of the discussion. As for the weighting functions, 
they were found to adhere to the expected shape -- concave at the lower probability 
range and convex at the higher part. But they switch their shape at a very high point 
on the 0-1 probability scale. Again, a different perspective on this question is 
suggested in Subsections 5.4 of the discussion.
The results obtained here for the General Challenge Hypothesis lends support to the 
psychological assumptions and considerations of the Challenge Theory.
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Figure 1. Scatter Diagrams and Linear Regression Lines of Pb(vi) vs. CI(vi)        
(a) for the 22 Gains Problems and (b) the 22 Loss problems
(a) Gains
(b) Losses
Of course, if the entire sample of 44 gain and loss problems is processed together (i.e., 
imposing the same set of four parameters on both, gain and loss problems), a lower 
correlation (r=-.87) is found between CI and Pb. See first row in Table 2. The second 
row in Table 2 shows a very high correlation (r=-.99) for Kahneman & Tversky's
(1979) sample of 11 gain and loss problems. However, this sample of problems is 
small, and the CI values are not well spread over their range. 
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Table 2. Pearson Correlation Coefficients, r, between Challenge Index, CI, (Eq. 
3) and Observed Proportion, Pb, of Bold Responses for All (Gain & Loss) 
Problems of This Study and of Kahneman & Tversky's (1979) Study*
r
0.95 
confidence 
interval
a0 a1 γ δ
All Problems of 
this study
n=44; N=126
-.877 (-.929, -.780) 1.5392 1.4806 0.7633 2.9011
All Binary
Problems of
KT (1979) study 
n=10; N~70 
-.989 (-.997, -.956) 3.0 0.6145 0.5599 2.7184
* Note that in Kahneman & Tversky's (1979) study, the expected value of the bold prospect is greater 
or equal to that of the default prospect, in all problems. In this study (where the expected value function 
plays no role) no such constraint was imposed on the selection of problems.
Figure 2. Scatter Diagrams and Linear Regression Lines of P(vi) vs. CI(vi)         
(a) for all 44 (Gain & Loss) Problems of This Study and (b) for all 11 (Gain & 
Loss) Problems of Kahneman & Tversky's (1979) Study
(a) Present Study
                                                  (b) Kahneman & Tversky, 1979
Overall the results, demonstrating a very high negative and linear relationship 
between CI and the proportions of bold choices, provide substantial evidence for the 
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proposed Challenge Theory. A two-fold cross validation performed on the data 
(Appendix A) provides further support for the proposed model. Nevertheless, 
replications must follow to establish the theory and examine whether different kinds 
of populations may require somewhat different optimization parameters to attain the 
high correlations hypothesized.
4. Determinants of Bold Decisions
As a descriptive, psychologically oriented theory, the Challenge Theory of decision 
making opens the way to investigate individual differences that are associated with 
decision under risk behavior. As an illustration of this possibility we formulate and 
test the following hypothesis.
4.1 The Resource Hypothesis: The more personal resources a person has, the more 
inclined that person would be to choose the bold prospect.
Rationale: People with more reserve resources such as money, relevant skills, or self-
confidence are better equipped to meet the challenge presented by the bold prospect; 
they are more likely to be able to contain and live with the kinds of dissonance 
anticipated in case they lose their bold gamble.
4.2 Testing the Resource Hypothesis
Two of the external (background) variables in the questionnaire could be interpreted 
as related to personal resources and may serve as indicators of that trait. Hence, they 
were hypothesized to be associated with the inclination to choose the bold prospect in 
the simple binary choice problems presented. These variables are:
 Gender, where male participants are assumed to have somewhat greater access 
to personal resources (e.g., financial skills).
That men are more inclined take risks in financial matters than women, is well 
documented (e.g., Powell & Ansic, 1997; Charnessa & Gneezy, 2012; 
Barber & Odean, 2001). The reasons behind such findings are often traced to 
social or psychological factors (social status, self-confidence). Here we 
propose to attribute this difference in risk attitude to men's enhanced 
familiarity and skills in financial matters, which conceptually fall under the 
general umbrella of enhanced resources.
 Personal Earnings, where those with greater earning power are assumed to 
have more personal resources than others.
People with greater earning power feel they can recover more easily from the 
dissonances expected following an unsuccessful gamble, than those with 
smaller earning power.
For the present purpose, the variable chosen for assessing individual's earning 
power was student's own earnings (not their family incomes, which could be 
used as another, distinct indicator). The tacit assumption was that the actual 
experience of personally earning money suggests some financial skill 
(considered here as a kind of resource) that would be reflected in respondents'
attitudes and gambling behavior, as hypothesized. Hence, participants were 
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asked what their hourly pay was in their recent job, if any. Nearly eighty 
percent (78.57%) of the responded with a figure higher than 0.
To test the Resource Hypothesis, we first defined a gain bold player as one whose 
number of bold choices from amongst the 22 gains problems exceeds the average 
number (6.94) of bold choices in the sample. Similarly, we define a loss bold player
as one whose number of bold choices from amongst the 22 loss problems exceeds the 
average number (11.79) of bold choices in the sample. Then the proportions of gain 
bold players and of loss bold players were computed for each subgroup— for males 
and females; and for "rich" and "poor" (defined according to whether the pay per hour 
exceeded the median or not). The results are shown in Table 3.
Table 3. Proportions (%) of Gains-Bold-Players and of Loss-Bold-Players
(i) by gender; (ii) by Earnings
(i) Gender
Male Female Difference Significance
Gains 65.5 49.3 16.2 0.07
Losses 60.0 62.0 -2.0 n.s.
(ii) Earnings
Rich Poor Difference Significance
Gains 65.1 47.6 17.5 0.05
Losses 60.3 61.9 -1.6 n.s.
Table 3 supports the Resource Hypothesis only for gain problems. Men more than 
women, and separately, the "rich" more than the "poor", were inclined to face the 
challenge posed by the bold prospects of gain problems. However, no significant 
differences were found by gender or by earnings with respect to loss-problems. This 
interesting result, at variance with our hypothesis, calls attention to the essential 
asymmetry between losses and gains. We shall comment on this asymmetry below, in 
the discussion section.
5. Discussion
5.1 Cutting the umbilical cord
It is only natural that in the search for descriptive theories of choice under risk,
prescriptive EUT has been adopted the as a point of departure: EUT is based on the 
plausible axioms of rational choice and on the compelling von Neumann-Morgenstern 
utility theorem. But, in the face of systematic violations of EUT observed in human 
behavior, descriptive theories, including the psychological-process theories, refined 
and improved EUT with important insights from psychology. The Challenge Theory 
of decision under risk proposed in this article aims to complete this trend by asserting 
that the psychological approach to decision under risk can stand on its own, without 
the historic normative economic platform.
As a psychological theory, Challenge Theory seeks to trace the mental processes that 
take place in decision making and specifically with reference the possible shift from a 
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default choice to the alternative. This is in contrast with the economic approach which
assumes that people evaluate and compare available prospects as separate, distinct
entities. In this sense, CT is a processual rather than a static theory. Moreover, rather 
than identify the one, universally best decision, CT takes account of individual 
differences in preferring the bold prospect (as defined here) and enables relaing such 
preferences to other individual characteristics.
CT presented in this study points to a research approach that aims to predict risk 
behavior and tests this approach in the case of simple binary decision problems. The 
viability of the proposed approach must be evaluated by suitable experimental 
replications and by studying the values of the optimizing parameters in diverse 
populations and experimental circumstances.
5.2 The psychological model
CT considers decision-makers' anticipated feelings towards the possible outcome of 
the prospect not chosen. However, CT does not incorporate these feelings (of regret or 
rejoicing) into the prospects offered to obtain a value for each prospect. Rather,
having specified the default prospect preferred by the "automatic mind" (System 1 
Processing), it assesses the difficulty, or the challenge experienced by the decision 
maker in abandoning this initial preference in favor of an alternative, the bold
prospect. The decision maker's task amounts then to deciding whether to meet this 
challenge level. The decision itself is personal and is determined by personality 
characteristics and circumstances to be explored.
Challenge Theory posits that the decision process in binary risk problems involves 
comparing the two outcomes, x0, and x1, and proceeds to represent this comparison in 
the form of a ratio between the monotonically transformed outcomes. This ratio 
constitutes one factor in the CI equation. It is plotted in Figure 3 as a function of its 
argument-pair (x0, x1). CT decision process also involves comparing the two 
probabilities, p0 and p1, associated with the outcomes. The result of this comparison, 
in the form of the difference between the monotonically transformed probabilities, 
constitutes the second factor in the CI equation. This difference is plotted in Figure 4
as a function of its argument-pair (p0, p1). Thus, CT decision process contrasts with 
that implied by most theories where options (x0, p0) and (x1, p1) are first evaluated 
separately to obtain a total worth for each, and then the two options are compared, 
typically by computing the difference between their total worth or an increasing 
function of that difference (e.g., Erev et al., 2010).  
5.3 Effects: certainty, reflection, low probabilities and loss aversion in CT perspective
It is of interest to examine the manifestations in CT of effects proposed by Kahneman 
& Tversky (1979) to account for observed choice behavior. Such an examination can 
cast light and enhance understanding of the paradigmatic shift embodied in CT. Table 
4 illustrates effects that are apparent in binary non-mixed gambles.
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Table 4. Illustration of Effects and their Manifestation in Terms of CI
Effect
Problem
D=Default
B=Bold option
                
% Bold CI*100
1. Certainty/Allais
Paradox
Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979 following Allais,
1953.
D: 3000, 1 
B: 4000, .80
    32% 6.64
D': 3000, .25 
B': 4000, .20     57% 2.80
2. Reflection
Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979
D: 3000, 1 
B: 4000, .80
    32% 6.64
D': -4000, .80
B': -3000, 1
    40%* 3.08
3. Overweighting 
low probabilities
D: 3000, .02
B: 6000, .01**
65% 1.57
4. Loss Aversion
See Table 5 and discussion below
* Recall that in loss problems, the often-labelled "safer" option (i.e., the option of higher probability of 
a smaller loss; here, (-3000, 1)) is defined in CT as the bold option and the 'risky' option is defined in 
CT as the default option. 
** In Kahneman & Tversky (1979) the problem was: (3000, .002; 6000, .001).
The certainty effect is illustrated by the first problem of Table 4, row 1, (3000,.8; 
3000,1). Respondents' preferences in this problem are affected by the relatively high 
CI (CI*100=6.64) which according to CT central hypothesis entails a relatively low 
proportion of bold choices (32% in the present study; 20% in Kahneman & Tversky, 
(1979)). The two choice-problems in row 1 illustrate a two-outcome simplified 
version of Allais paradox (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), where the probabilities in the 
first problem were multiplied by 0.25 to obtain those of the second problem. The 
seemingly inconsistent high preference rates for the less certain option (B') in the 
second problem in row 1, (3000, .25; 4000, 20), is explained by CT simply: Because 
of the smaller difference between the two probabilities (0.25-0.20=0.05), CI is much 
lower here (CI*100=2.80) than in the first problem (6.64), prompting the gambler to 
go for the bold option.
The reflection effect is expressed in CT simply as adherence (by the majority) to the 
respective default option: (3000, 1) in gains and to (-4000, .80) in losses. See
problems in Table 4 row 2, where a minority (40%) chose bold (in Kahneman & 
Tversky (1979) the corresponding figure was18%). While in Prospect Theory the 
reflection effect is regarded as a curious reversal -- a surprising switch from risk 
aversion to risk seeking (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979 p. 268); In CT the reflection 
effect is built-in into the conceptual basis of the theory. 
The effect of overweighting low probabilities is illustrated in the problem in Table 4 
row 3. In CT terms this overweighting is a consequence of the very small difference 
(0.01) between the probabilities which results in low CI (CI*100=1.57), i.e., strong 
inclination to shift from the default to the bold option, (6000, 0.01). An essentially 
different effect, also considered by Kahneman & Tversky (1979, p.281) as an instance 
of overweighting low probabilities, occurs in the problem (5, 1; 5000, 0.001), where 
only one probability is low and 72% were found to prefer the bold option (5000, 
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0.001). Kahneman & Tversky's explanation involves the shapes of the value and 
weighting functions. But CT explains the observed preference differently, namely, by 
the very small ratio of x0^a0/x1^a1 resulting in an extremely low CI. These arguments 
hold equally for the corresponding loss problems (Problems 8' and 14' in Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1979).
The predominance of loss-avoidance over gain-seeking (a phenomenon known as loss 
aversion) is manifested by CT in the difference between CI+, the CI of a given gain 
problem, and CI-, the CI of its symmetrical (mirror-image) loss problem7.  Table 5 
presents this difference (CI+ - CI-)*100 for the five symmetrical gain/loss problem-
pairs in our study. See last column in Table 5. The essential thing to notice about 
these differences is their sign: they are all positive, i.e., CI+ > CI-. According to CT 
this means that people are more likely to switch from the default option to the bold 
option in losses than in gains; hence, more likely to avoid the greater loss than to opt 
for the greater gain of a similar size. The magnitudes of the recorded differences (CI+-
CI-) may well reflect the extent of loss aversion in each case, suggesting that loss 
aversion depends on the probabilities as well as on the outcomes. 
It is noteworthy that the four effects discussed above are explained in CT by the 
single parameter CI, not by reference to the shapes of value functions or weighting 
functions, whose stability is not assumed by CT.
Table 5. CT Representation of Loss Aversion:
CI in a Gain Problem is Greater than in the Symmetrical Loss Problem
Illustration 
No. 
Problem-Pair
D=Default
B=Bold option
% Bold 
(This Study)
CI*100 ∆CI*100
(CI+-CI-) *100
1
D: 3000, 1 
B: 4000, .80
     32% 6.64
3.36
D': -4000, .80
B': -3000, 1
     40% 3.08
2
D: 3000, .25 
B: 4000, .20
     57% 2.80
1.47
D': -4000, .20
B': -3000, 25
     68% 1.33
3
D: 3000, .90 
B: 6000, .45
       9% 7.61
4.59
D': -6000, .45
B': -3000, 90
     36% 3.01
4
D: 240, 1 
B: 1000, .25
     23% 6.59
3.84
D': -1000, .25
B': -240, 1
     38% 2.74
5
D: 3000, .02 
B: 6000, .01
     65% 1.57
0.41
D': -6000, .01
B': -3000, .02
     55% 1.15
7 I.e., the loss problem created from the given gain problem by switching the outcome signs from 
positive to negative.
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Finally, it is interesting to comment on how CT conceptual framework can take 
account of dominated prospects directly and simply: If xi>xj>0 and pi>pj the analytic 
mind (System 2 processing) reinforces and readily confirms the automatic mind initial 
evaluation based on the p's. No prior editing phase (suggested in Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979) is required; the entire decision process is naturally captured by the 
psychological model.
5.4 The impact of outcomes and probabilities on decisions: CT vs. EUT-based 
theories
EUT-based descriptive theories use value and weighting functions to transform 
outcomes and probabilities. The transformed quantities (often interpreted as 
subjective outcomes and subjective probabilities, respectively) serve to compute the 
total worth of each prospect for explaining empirically observed preferences. In CT, 
an outcome, x0 or x1, is not conceived as impacting on the decision by itself, but rather 
as acting within the pair (x0, x1), where the outcomes are transformed and combined to 
form the ratio, ݔ௔బ/ݔ௔భ , constituting the first factor in the CI equation. Hence, it is the 
impact of this pair on decision (in effect, on the value of the challenge index, CI) that 
is of interest. This is illustrated in Figure 3. Similarly, the transformed probabilities 
are combined to form the difference, ݓ଴(݌଴)−ݓଵ	(݌ଵ	), constituting the second factor 
in the CI equation illustrated in Figure 4. 
Figure 3.  The First Factor, x0^a0 / x1^a1, of CI as a Function of the 
Two Outcomes: Illustration with a0=1.19, a1=1.23
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Figure 4.  The Second Factor, w(p0)-w(p1), of CI as a Function of the 
Two Probabilities, where ݓ(݌) = ఋ௣ംఋ௣ംା	(ଵି௣)ം . Illustration with γ=0.73; δ=2.62
Observed decision are now explained by the single quantity CI, not by shapes of value 
functions or weighting functions, as such. And since each of the outcomes offered is 
not considered separately (but only in conjunction with the other outcome in the pair), 
the transformed outcome need not be interpreted as representing a subjective value of 
that outcome.
Yet, it is of interest to note the magnitudes of the extracted parameters, a0, a1, γ, and δ,
which jointly optimize predictions, and compare them with those that may be 
obtained in future studies. Do they vary with the type of population? Do they vary 
with the magnitudes of the amounts or the probabilities? Or with the spacings
between the amounts or the probabilities? And, ultimately, how good are the resultant 
predictions in cross-validation exercises?
5.5 How many free parameters?
As noted above (Section 3.1), this paper details results obtained for the choice of four 
free parameters. This choice was made after comparing results obtained as the number 
of parameters increases from 3 to 4 and from 4 to 6. We found that while in gains the 
improvements in r were small (from -.9145 to -.9174 to -.9276); in the case of losses a 
larger improvement (from -.9098 to -.9314) was recorded when the number of 
parameters increased from 3 to 4. (But in the 6-parameter model improvement was 
small again, with r= -.9376.) Hence for losses we opted for the 4-parameter model
and for reasons of symmetry adopted the same number of parameters for gains. 
However, our evidence for the optimal number of free parameters is not conclusive
and the simpler model of three parameters, a, γ, δ (i.e. a0=a1), for gains and three, a',
γ', δ', (i.e. a'0=a'1), for losses which yielded here a good fit with the data (r=-.9145 for 
gains and r=-.9098 for losses), should be re-examined in future studies. At this point it 
is worth noting that the technical simplicity of the 3-parameter model in each case 
(gains and losses) is accompanied by an appealing substantive-interpretative 
advantage: With the outcomes raised to the same power, the ratio x0/x1 becomes a 
basic, psychologically meaningful quantity.
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In conclusion of this subsection, we note that alternative functional forms have not 
been systematically tested in this study. The power functional form adopted here for 
transforming the outcomes has been justified and employed by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992) and by others (e.g. Harrison et al., 2009). As for the functional 
form for transforming probabilities, we did consider the one-parameter functional 
form ݓ(݌) = ௣ം(௣ംା	(ଵି௣)ം)భ/ം employed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) but found it to 
produce much poorer results in this study (r=-0.71 for gains and -0.60 for losses) than 
the function employed here. For comparison, when no parameters at all were used, 
(i.e., if ܥܫ = |௫బ||௫భ| (݌଴	 − ݌ଵ	) The results were about the same for gains (r=-0.69) but lower 
for losses (r=-0.47).
                                      
5.6 The role of extant wealth: three views
What is the role of a person's existing wealth in preferring one prospect over another 
when facing a decision problem? In EUT the objects of choice are probability 
distributions over total wealth. Hence, the expected consequences of the decision 
(gains or losses) are each combined with extant wealth to assess the value to the 
decision maker of the resultant total wealth. Prospect Theory, based on people's 
observed behavior, finds that existing wealth usually marks a reference point relative 
to which, gains and losses are defined and assessed by the decision maker. But PT 
assigns no essential role to existing wealth in decision making itself and reveals that
"The carriers of values are gains and losses, not final assets" (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1992, p. 299). Challenge Theory, in its reconstruction of the decision process, 
essentially accepts this view. However, by foregoing the need to determine a 
normative choice and allowing instead individual differences, CT opens the door for 
investigating associations between risk behavior and other individual characteristics, 
such as wealth, as was demonstrated above in Section 4, thereby assigning a role to 
extant wealth. Moreover, CT allows for associating risk behavior with flexible
interpretations of wealth such as those that include present or future earning power, 
confidence in future life-prospects and other manifestations of individual resources.
5.7 The gain-loss asymmetry
Arithmetically, positive and negative numbers are symmetrical about the 0 point.
Psychologically, the prospect of obtaining a positive amount is interpreted and 
processed by the mind differently from incurring a negative amount, i.e., a loss. This 
psychological asymmetry is manifested for example by the phenomenon labeled "loss 
aversion" by Tversky & Kahneman (1992). The reasons for this asymmetry could be 
as follows. 
To conceive the loss of an amount of money, one must first picture that amount
thereby endowing it with a sort of mental existence. Then one must perform the
opposite mental operation of annulment to conceive the absence of that amount8. This 
operation which involves an extra mental burden in conceiving a loss—compared 
with that of conceiving a gain -- may account for asymmetries between gains and 
losses in choice behavior. For the extra cognitive complexity of conceiving a loss (a 
difficulty that may be coded by the automatic processing system as an added risk) 
8 Cf. Ironic Process Theory; e.g., "Don’t think of a white bear".
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inclines the decision maker towards the less risky option. This is a psychological-
processual explanation, referring to the mental processing of input information.
But there is deeper, more substantive asymmetry between gains and losses. A gain is 
perceived by the living organism as an incidental favorable event, one whose 
recurrence is likely to be advantageous. A loss, on the other hand, is interpreted by the 
organism as a potential threat to its very structure; since its recurrence can destroy the 
organism as a living system.9
Challenge Theory exhibits both, similarities and differences, between gains and 
losses. A basic formal similarity is embodied in Eq. 3, a single formula that assesses 
the challenge-level for both gains and losses. This is noteworthy because our
reconstruction of the cognitive decision process involving gains and that involving 
losses, were conducted separately and independently.
An interesting difference between gain and loss problems appears in our investigation 
of the association between bold choice behavior and personal resources: Thus, while
as hypothesized, people who earn more are more likely to prefer the bold prospect in 
gain problems, no such association was found in the case of loss problems (Table 3).
It seems that when losses are in sight the poor are just as likely to prefer the bold 
prospect as the rich precisely because (pursuing System 2 processing) that prospect
sets a limit on the amount of possible loss, protecting them from excessive loss, to 
which they are more vulnerable.
Finally, the present findings exhibit similarity in the order-of-magnitude of the four 
key parameters, a0, a1, γ, δ, inferred for gain problems and inferred for loss problems.
The differences originate in the psychological difference between gains and losses
and, as argued above, represent the predominance of loss-avoidance over gain-seeking 
behavior, known as loss aversion. 
5.8 Conclusion
Challenge Theory tackles the question of explaining choice under risk from a 
psychological perspective rather than an economic one. Forgoing the relics of EUT, 
such as the rationality axioms, the notions of expected value, risk-seeking or risk-
aversion and the concern with identifying the one most preferred choice, Challenge 
Theory suggests a new paradigm and proposes a simple formula, based on a 
reconstruction of mental decision processes, for describing the relative frequency of 
people who prefer one prospect over another in a class of simple binary choice 
problems. The possibility that opens up for associating individual choice behavior 
with other personality traits carries with it the promise of enriching the study of 
behavior under risk, with possible relevance to domains of application.
9 Excessive gains can also be detrimental to a system, constituting a potential threat to its structural 
stability (Shye, 1989; 2014). However, usually they are not perceived as a threat because of a tacit
assumption that resources are generally limited, rendering the occurrence of harmful gains unlikely. 
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Appendix A. Two-Fold Cross Validation
1. Procedure
The sample of 126 respondents was randomly divided into two subsamples, A and 
B. The following cross-validation procedure was carried out separately for gain-
problems and for loss problems. Each subsample in its turn served as a Training 
Subsample on which the optimization procedure was performed, resulting in
(i) the optimized r(CI, Pb), the correlation between Challenge Index and the 
proportion choosing the bold prospect; and in 
(ii) four optimizing value-function and weighting-function parameters. 
Then, these four parameters were employed to compute r(CI, Pb) in the alternative
subsample, Testing-Subsample.
2. Results
Results of this cross-validation exercise are satisfactory both in the case of gains 
and in the case of losses: r(CI, Pb) remain very high in all testing-subsamples. The
correlations obtained in the testing subsamples are as high as in the training 
subsample in the case of gains, and almost as high in the case of losses.
Table 4. Results of Two-Fold Cross Validation
In this table, the row "A => B" indicates results of the cross validation procedure where
A is the training subsample and B is the testing subsample. In "B => A" subsample roles are reversed
      
  
Training-
Subsample
Correlation
Value Function 
Parameters 
Exponents
Weighting Function 
Parameters
Curvature   Elevation
Testing-
Subsample
Correlation
  r a0 a1 γ δ r
GAINS  
A => B -0.9 1.18 1.15 0.7 2.41 -0.9
B => A  -0.92 1.27 1.23 0.77 2.84 -0.92
Average -0.91 1.225 1.19 0.735 2.625 -0.91
LOSSES
A => B -0.89 1.74 1.48 0.65 2.72 -0.88
B => A -0.91 1.39 1.33 0.67 3.66 -0.89
Average -0.9  1.565 1.405 0.66 3.19 -0.885
